The Vanguard must die in Bolivia
“The National
Vanguard,” in Italian Avanguardia Nazionale, was a nationalist, anti-communist
and anti-bourgeois movement founded in 1960 and led by Stefano Delle Chiaie
(1936-2019).
The following
is a translation of a chapter of the 2012 autobiographical book by Stefano Delle
Chiaie: “L’aquila e il condor” (The Eagle and the Condor). It narrates the events
that led to the murder in La Paz, Bolivia, of Pierluigi Pagliai, a young Italian
political militant and friend of Delle Chiaie.
On August 2,
1980, a bomb exploded in the Bologna, Italy, railroad station, killing eighty-five
people and wounding hundreds. It was the cruelest of the series of bloody attacks
that began with the 1969 bombing of the branch of Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura,
in Milan.
Right away, the
government authorities decided to orient the investigation toward a phantomatic
“black medusa,” that is, an international extreme-right organization, although
there were several other tracks they could have followed. That was nothing new.
The intelligence
services began to issue notes to the investigators and the media, to which Delle
Chiaie refers as “veline.”
(During the
Fascist era, the state issued official information notes to the newspapers. The
notes were copied and distributed on very thin copy paper, which in Italian is
called “velina (plural “veline”). Since then, the word “velina has acquired the
negative connotation of a propaganda messages or an order given via a note to
the media by a controlling state.) In this translation we called them “notes.”
But there was a problem with these diversionary notes, that is, the fact that all the people mentioned in them became potential defendants or witnesses in a court of law, and all the charges had be substantiated. And they began to die in unclear and always violent circumstances.
I realize that this post is based on the assumption that the readers know already some of the history of post-world-war II Italy. I added notes that I hope would make it clearer; and if you'd like to know more about the terrorism in Italy, in this blog there is another post that would be very helpful: Let the slaughter begin.
But let us Stefano Delle Chiaie tell his story:
To understand the reasons of the criminal murder of Pierluigi Pagliai it is necessary to start from the ignoble allegation that I and a few others were responsible for the August 2, 1980, Bologna train station massacre; and how the magistrate Aldo Gentile, with the complicity of the international criminal Elio Ciolini, used the accusation. [1]
The responsibility of what followed must be clearly attributed to the Italian government agencies, the investigating magistrates, the reporters, and the politicians who, for cowardice or convenience, kept silent about the troubling developments that followed the bombing of the station. They were all more interested in speculating than in establishing the truth, which they owed, above all, to the victims.
Elimination Plan
As the
readers might remember, warrant-officer Sanapo, in his statements given to the
magistrate Sica, had revealed that colonel Belmonte had invited him to provide
the name of one Mr. Bragaglia and mine (Stefano Delle Chiaie, TN) as organizers
of the Bologna train station massacre.[2]
Mr. Bragaglia,
whom I had never met, was known to the police for his political militancy and
for his friendship with Valerio Fioravanti.[3]
His name had been inserted into a “note” about the massacre to give credibility
to the alleged close ties between Avanguardia Nazionale and the NAR (Nuclei
Armati Rivoluzionari. Armed Revolutionary Nuclei).[4]
Mr. Bragaglia
owned a Renault 5 Alpine. In the evening of January 6, 1981, a DIGOS (General
Investigations and Special Operations Division NT) squad took position near Via
Cortina d’Ampezzo in Rome, near his residence.
A Renault 5
arrived and the agents, convinced that it was Bragaglia’s, opened fire in
circumstances that were never cleared. But Bragaglia was not in the car. Instead,
there was a couple who was coming back home with some friends. The lady,
twenty-eight-year-old Laura Rendina, was killed. The husband said that the
policemen, in civilian clothes, had fired two shots in the air and while he,
terrified, was trying to get away with the car they had fired more shots on
target, hitting his wife.
Later, it
was revealed that the agents had been looking for an R5 Alpine and, after a
series of contradictory versions of the story, an official one was released
according to which: The police were looking for “neo-fascist” elements
responsible for an attack, and since it was dark they had misidentified the
people in the car. According to this version, the investigators had some
information that was classified, which explained why the policemen had reacted
as they had, when the car tried to run away. This secret was never
declassified. For a simple coincidence, Bragaglia had escaped an elimination
attempt.
According to
the “note” entitled “Terror on the trains,” Giorgio Vale (1961-1982), a member
of the NAR, was the man who had bought the tickets found in the famous
suitcase.[5]
Vale was a fugitive when on May 5, 1982, a large police force broke into his
hiding apartment in Via Decio Mure.
The force employed
by the agents was unwarranted because the police had obtained the keys of the
apartment from the person that had rented it to Giorgio Vale. The police used four
submachine guns and four handguns and fired 140 shots. The videos of the room
in which Vale was killed would disappear from the Italian state television
RAI’s archives. The police report mentioned that Vale had been killed with one
single shot at the head, to give credit to the suicide version of his death.
That was later debunked by an exam of the body which did not find any trace of
gun powder on Vale’s hands.
Vincenzo
Parisi who, at the time, was SISDE (Servizio Informazioni per la Sicurezza Democratica.
Intelligence Service for the Security of Democracy NT) vice-director, and
became chief of Italian state police in 1987, in a deposition said that Vale’s
father had been negotiating with the police and the intelligence services the
surrender of his son.
But Vale had
to die, because his name was listed in the “notes” among those supposedly
implicated in the Bologna massacre.
The “Pall
Mall” operation instead was designed for me. It envisaged the arrival in
Bolivia of two Italian observers to localize me. Then a group of French
mercenaries would come to seize and dump me in Lake Titicaca. For the hiring of
the mercenaries and the logistical organization of the operation on July 17,
1982, Elio Ciolini had received a $ 20,000 advance at the Hotel du Rhone in
Geneva, with the promise of $ 200,000 more when the task had been accomplished.
The
agreement had been made between UCIGOS[6]
officer Michele Fragranza and one Morselli in the presence of the magistrate
Gentile. Fragranza himself would confirm that in his March 17, 1983, deposition
to the magistrate Pierluigi Vigna. Chief Parisi too, on October 20, 1987,
during the Bologna train-station massacre trial, said that: “Once again, the
one who worked to arrest Stefano Delle Chiaie was Gentile […] the matter was delegated
to Dr. Fragranza.” At the same time, the SISMI was also plotting my kidnapping
with Elio Ciolini.
According to
him, the operation was going to be carried out in August. Meanwhile, he had obtained
M£ 85 (million Italian Lire), in two different occasions.
General Pasquale
Notarnicola[7],
in his October 14, 1987, court appearance in Bologna, during the same trial,
stated: “Colonel Sportelli and colonel Reitani (both from SISMI, NT) were the
actual interlocutors with Ciolini […] when he returned from Switzerland and was
freed, he proposed the capture of Delle Chiaie”.
General Nino
Lugaresi, SISMI director from 1981 to 1984 added: “Ciolini had promised to
deliver Delle Chiaie on Ferragosto (the 15th of August) or soon
before. Probably in the sea. It was 1982.” But Bolivia does not have a sea,
only a big lake, in which I should have disappeared. Everything had been
planned. There was even a false recorded entry of me in the United States
through Miami, on August 9. The border registration card had my real name on
it: S. Delle Chiaie.
Later, the
Italian judiciary, that knew that on that day I was in Bolivia, requested that
document, but they were told that it had been lost. That was to be expected, since
the operation had failed.
This “final
solution” had been planned by colonel Sportelli with the help of MichaelLedeen. The latter, an old friend of Henry Kissinger, was an advisor to U.S.
Secretary Alexander Haig, but he had also collaborated with the Italian
intelligence services and with Prime Minister Cossiga during the Aldo Moro
affair. On June 1, 1987, during his court appearance in the Bologna train
station massacre trial, Francesco Pazienza[8]
also revealed that colonel Sportelli had close ties with the Mossad.
If “Pall Mall” had been successful, they would have said that I had entered the United States with the protection of the C.I.A.
The failure
of operation “Pall Mall,” in August of 1982 did not deter the intelligence
services and the Interior Ministry from making new attempts at my life. Another
operation, code named “Marlboro,” was prepared, taking advantage of a
government power vacuum in Bolivia, due to the transfer of power from President
Vildoso to President Siles Zuazo.
On October
9, 1982, an order was issued to prepare an Alitalia’s airplane, a DC-10
christened Giotto, for an intercontinental trip. The First Officer was
Marcello Pesaresi, the Second, enlisted by the intelligence services, was one
Marchini. The planned route was to Caracas, Venezuela, with a fuel reserve for
an alternate destination. On the Giotto there was a group of SISDE and
UCIGOS operatives, at the orders of Commissioner Fragranza. It was rumored that
on-board there was also Mario Fabbri, a former member of the Caravella,[9]
who had later enlisted in the state police.
 |
| The Giotto |
The
policemen, who landed in La Paz, went directly to the San Fernando building, in
Plaza Isabel, but did not find me there. In fact, I was in Venezuela, and the
apartment had been abandoned long ago, before we all had moved to Calacoto.
Pierluigi
Pagliai should have been in Argentina and was preparing to return to Italy to
turn himself in, because, at that point, he was wanted only for draft-dodging.
Claudio
Larrea, a Santa Cruz captain of the Bolivian Carabineros who had befriended Pagliai,
had attracted him back to Bolivia with a pretext. Having learned that Pagliai
was in Santa Cruz, the Italian operatives flew there.
When the Giotto
landed in Santa Cruz, a group of our Bolivian comrades, suspecting that
there was an on-going operation directed against us, kept the aircraft in their
gunsights. They were reassured that the airliner had made an emergency landing
due to a technical problem and decided to stand down.
The
Italians, through captain Larrea, had secured the help of a group of
Carabineros led by a major by the name of Zugel and by colonel Nelson Peredo.
Their complicity had been bought by two SISDE officers who had arrived in
Bolivia on October 8.
Captain Larrea
made an appointment with Pagliai for 11:00 AM, in front of the church of
Nuestra Señora de Fátima. Pierluigi arrived on a Toyota. The trap sprang and
his car was surrounded by men who came out of a white Lauda and four other
cars.
Pierluigi
locked the doors, rolled up the window and put his hand behind his neck. An
order was given and, after breaking a front window, one of the executioners
fired two shots point-blank at Pagliai with a .22 caliber handgun. Pierluigi
was carried to the white Lauda and the killers left. About twenty Italians and
forty Bolivian Carabineros had taken part in the ambush.
It was on a
Sunday, and many people who were leaving the church after Mass witnessed the
scene. Among them there was the El País reporter Mabel Azcui, who wrote
a wide reportage about the attack for the Bolivian paper El Mundo.
Pagliai was
taken to the Santa Cruz Petrolero Hospital and, the same night, following
circulating rumors about a possible action by his Bolivian comrades to free
him, he was moved to the La Paz Isabel clinic with the Alitalia’s plane, on
which the Bolivians accomplices climbed too, because they were afraid of
retaliations.
During the
night, Pagliai was operated on by Dr. Brunn of the U.S. Embassy and, on October
11, against the opinion of the Bolivian doctors, he was taken to the airport to
be embarked on the Giotto and be flown back to Italy.
The Bolivian
civil aviation personnel of the airport tried to block the departure of the
plane, but U.S. ambassador Corr obtained by the Bolivian Minister of Interior
an expulsion decree.
The Bolivian
personnel, with the support of the military present in the airport, continued
to resist the take-off, citing failure to pay the airport handling fees. Once
again, ambassador Corr intervened and paid the fees. The plane, on which agent
Adler had also climbed, took off for Puerto Rico where the C.I.A. agent disembarked.
All the
newspapers and the press agencies eliminated the pictures of the operations.
Pierluigi Pagliai would die in Italy on November 5.
This state
sponsored murder was covered by many lies.
The October
15, 1982, report, signed by Gaspare De Francisci, the UCIGOS director, states
that the operation had been coordinated with the Bolivian authorities when, at
the time of the illegal endeavor, in Bolivia there wasn’t even a government,
because President Siles Zuazo had taken office afterwards, at 4 p.m. on October
10. To cover the identity of Richard Adler, the report states that the Alitalia
plane had arrived in La Paz with an Interpol agent on board, while Adler was
with the C.I.A. The report also states that the Bolivian police had fatally
shot Pierluigi Pagliai: an attribution of responsibility that has always been
rejected by the Bolivian authorities, even in official documents. And nothing
is mentioned about the decisive intervention of the U.S. ambassador.
Antezana,
answering a parliamentary inquiry by representative Carlos Valverde, said that
he was informed about the Pagliai case only on October 11, and that he could not
comment on what had happened the day before in Santa Cruz, because his
government had not been in charge yet. In fact, the expulsion order was dated
October 11 and was issued upon the insistence of ambassador Corr, who later stated,
in front of the Bolivian Congress, that his intervention had been requested by
the Italians.
And so,
Pierluigi Pagliai, who was not in debt with the Italian so-called justice
system, was also suppressed so that the elimination plan, elaborated with the
complicity of the magistrate Gentile, could definitely close the “massacres”
file of Italian history with the sacrifice of another innocent man.
Maybe it is
a coincidence that, in a period of ten months, three people, who had all been mentioned
in the government “notes” as people implicated in the Bologna train station
explosive attack were assassinated; and three more people narrowly escaped the
same fate. But the death of all these people would have closed the chapter of
the massacres, from Piazza Fontana to Bologna, and it would have been a very
fortuitous coincidence for someone who wanted all the lies that had been
disseminated during the investigations to be forgotten.
The people
who were truly responsible for the slaughter would have been saved, and the
investigators would have been cleared of any wrongdoing. And the victims of the
assassination would have been disgraced without appeal. All that, with the
complicity of the Italian intelligence services, the magistrates, and the
press.
But who is
willing to demand justice? Nobody, because as the slogan that is still valid
today recites” “to kill a fascist is not a crime.”
[1] Stefano
Delle Chiaie. L’Aquila e il Condor.
Edizioni Settimo Sigillo Page 272
[2]
Colonel Giuseppe Belmonte of the Italian SISMI (Servizio Informazioni Sicurezza
Militare. Military Security Intelligence Service) contacted Warrant-Officer
Francesco Sanapo, commander of the Carabinieri military police station of Taranto.
Colonel Belmonte arranged an exchange of correspondence with WO Sanapo to make believe
that the latter was a SISMI’s source of information. Then Belmonte fed Sanapo
the information to pass back to SISMI.
[3]
Valerio Fioravanti (1958-) is an Italian former child actor and convicted terrorist.
He was a leading member of the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Armed
Nuclei).
[4]
NAR was an Italian extreme-right terrorist organization that carried out many
assassinations during the 1977-1981 period.
[5]
According to the intelligence-services-provided “Terror on trains note,” Stefano
Delle Chiaie had organized a series of bombing against trains and railroad
installations. The necessary material would be transported in a suitcase by
train. On January 12, 1981, Colonel Belmonte warned SISMI that the suitcase was
going to be transported on the following day. In fact, it was found. It contained
weapons, explosives, foreign newspapers, and two plane tickets. On the train,
by coincidence, there was also a SISMI agent.
[6] U.C.I.G.O.S.
Ufficio Centrale per le Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali. Special
Operations and General Investigations Central Office. It was a department of
Italian state police.
[7] General
Notarnicola was SISMI chief of Counter-Intelligence and Anti-Terrorism division.
[8]
Pazienza was a “business consultant” recruited by SISMI. He was eventually
convicted of mishandling evidence in the investigation of the Bologna train station
massacre.
[9] The
Caravella was a university-based group that later merged with the FUAN
(National Action University Front)
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